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2.

PRA METHODOLOGY
Before a sampling of the recent trade studies developed for the ISS program management is presented, PRA background and its methodology will be briefly discussed.
A PRA models a set of scenarios, their frequencies and the associated consequences. The effort required to perform this modeling is justified since it can help in optimizing a design by factoring in safety considerations, or during operational phases, reveal the safest procedures for workarounds or complying with operational constraints.
Modeling a scenario under PRA begins by considering any initiating events that eventually could damage the Station or hann its inhabitants. Under this modeling scheme, each initiating event can results in one or more pivotal events that terminate in one or more predefined End States (see Figure  1 ). 'The logic process starting with an initiator followed by many conditional events (pivotal events), finally ending with one or more End States, is referred to as an Event Sequence Diagram (ESD). These ESDs are derived from flight rules, hazard reports, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), evaluation of Critical Item List (CIL), operations guidelines a i d system engineering knowledge. In addition, this risk assessment technique models the logical inter-relationships, dependencies, and reliability of the system. It is important that the uncertainties in the natural variability of physical processes (i.e., aleatory uncertainty) and the uncertainties in knowledge of these processes (i.e., epistemic uncertainty) are included in the model to convey the uncertainty of the results. Data uncertainty is an integral component of the model. 
Initiating Event
The initiating event is an event which perturbates the modeled system requiring human intervention (from operators or crew-members) andlor system responses. Depending on what occurs subsequently (system andor human response), the system will either go back to a "normal" operating state or progress to a "bad" state (see discussion of End States to follow). These responses can be classified as either:
Protective -an event that reduces the likelihood the initiating event will produce an undesired end state, Mitigative -an event that reduces the severity of the end state, Aggravative -an event that increases the severity of the end state, the frequency of reaching an undesired end state, or both, or Benign -an event that has little or no effect on the course of the scenario although it may have been perceived as a contributor prior to the analysis.
Pivotal Events & Fault Trees
Pivotal events capture the resulting system responses after an initiating event. Pivotal events are those events that must occur in order to prevent the initiating event from propagating further. These may take the form of systems responses whether hardware or software, procedural steps including crew or ground intervention, physical conditions, or time constraints. The success or failure of the system and/or human responses (discussed above), or possibly the Occurrence or non-occurrence of some external conditions or key phenomena will determine the result of a pivotal event.
The probabilities or outcomes of the pivotal events are usually determined by the development of fault trees. In other words, fault trees are used to determine the probability of the two paths (success or failure) of the pivotal event. The bottom levels of the fault trees are the basic events of the model (lowest level that is modeled). The data to support these fault trees are based on failure histones and other historical data sources.
End Sates
The results of the PRA are calculated by combining all like End States across all the ESDs. Resultantly, the mean and distribution of the probability of occurrence of each of the End State can be calculated.
The ISS Program goals for the study and analysis capability were to examine those rcenarios that can lead to:
Loss of a crewmember Situations requiring evacuation. 
SAMPLE OF TRADE STUDIES UTILIZED BY PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
Several recent trade studies will he highlighted in this section to demonstrate the wide variety of analysis that the ISS PRA provides.
SM Window Cover vs Vozdukh Spare
As the team completed the f r s t phase of the model development, the Program Manager asked if the PRA could he used to quantify the risks with an immediate manifest decision. There had been ongoing issues with the carbondioxide removal systems on-hoard the Station. Parts of the Russian system (Vozdukh) had failed and been repaired. Shortly after the launch of the US Lab Module, the US Carbon Dioxide Removal Assembly (CDRA) also failed. The program was looking to fly spare parts for the Vozdukh system on the next shuttle flight. The issue was, in order to fly these parts something already manifested would have to he removed. The item under consideration was a window cover for the Service Module designed to protect against orbital debris strikes. The question posed was; which item provides the most risk reduction?
The results showed that providing Vozdukh with spare parts would improve risk by an order of magnitude while the window cover improved risk by a small margin. This result confirmed the "gut feel" the Program Manager had based on all the other input he had received. This study allowed him the ability to quantitatively measure the impact of his decision. The next Shuttle flight was remanifested and the spare parts suggested were flown. 
Sensitiviry Analysis; DDCU Quantification
During the integration and test of the DC-to-DC Converter Units (DDCU) used in the US Segment, NASA Independent Assessment (IA) review teams indicated that the reliability of the DDCU's would he less then advertised. The discrepancy in. mean time between failures (MTBFs) was several orders of magnitude, IA predicting an MTBF of 3,440 hours, the logistics and maintenance team using 800.000 hours and the program requirement of 87,600
hours. The program requested that the PRA be used to determine whether this discrepancy was significant from a system perspective. A baseline value was calculated from a synthesis of industry data --34,000 hours.
The results showed that even though there is redundancy in the system, the early phase of the assembly was vulnerable to DDCU failures. The study revealed that should the DDCU he as had as predicted by the independent assessment organization, the impact to the Station operations would be substantial since there would an order of magnitude increase in risk. However, if the actual MTBF were closer to the ISS requirement or the logistics & maintenance team's prediction, the risk would he only marginally better than the baseline estimate. 
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Some studies performed for program bad indicated that the Station would require significant crew hours to maintain an operating and functioning Station. These increased maintenance activities (more than originally anticipated) would result in only about 4 hours of science conducted every day. Since reducing maintenance activities would free up the crew to conduct science, a trade study was performed to assess if there would he more science, if the program deferred all maintenance activities to times when the Space Shuttle was docked to the Station. During routine Shuttle dockings, Shuttle crewmemhers could be trained and then dedicated to make the needed repairs and to perform all preventative maintenance. However, the results as seen in Figure 6 show that the science time achieved by adopting this plan would actually decrease. While in the short term, the number of hours would increase because more crew members can perform science, the deferred maintenance activities would increase the probability of reaching a catastrophic end state like evacuation. Therefore, in the long term, there would he a greater probability of being unmanned due to evacuation or greater amount of time spent performing critical maintenance (due to preventative maintenance being deferred). Resultantly, less science will actually be performed in the long run. The next step in the analysis was to temper this affect by deferring all hut the more critical maintenance to dedicated Shuttle maintenance crews. This result showed that there was a possible improvement of 2 to 3 times the amount of science compared to retaining the baseline maintenance plans.
Figure 6 -Event Sequence Diagram Example
CRV-Soyuz Comparison
To provide a more robust and medically safe escape system for the crew, the program always considered either replacing or complementing the Soyuz vehicle (as the escape system).
At the time, the X-38 program (a US crew return vehicle) was in development. A PRA trade study was performed to determine the hest escape vehicle configuration for varying crew sizes. The analysis revealed that the capability to return several types of medical cases was the key driver. For instance, the Soyuz vehicle cannot transport crewmembers needing an IV or when an injured crewmember must he transported in a prone position. Due to this fact, the X-38 rescue vehicle with the expanded medical capabilities improved risk more than two redundant Soyuz vehicles (see Figure 7) . However, the enhanced redundancy achieved by two independently designed and built system (X-38 and Soyuz) in complement would achieved the hest risk reduction. Logistics and provisioning studies had indicated that water and food shortages might force the program to reduce the crew size from 3 to 2. Furthermore, these logistics constraints (not having the Shuttle which provides the main resupply capability for the Station) could even force the Station to be unmanned for temporary periods. The Program Manager wanted to know the relative risks of loosing the station with 3 crewmembers, 2 crewmembers or leaving the station unmanned. Was there any added risk incurred by reducing the crew size, or even more drastic, by unmanning the Station? A trade study was performed to compare these options by analyzing the scenarios for 6 months and one-year evaluation periods.
The results, as seen on Figure 8 , show that there is almost a magnitude increase in the loss of Station probabilities by having crewmembers on board verses unmanning the Station. Unmanning the Station leaves it vulnerable to failures, which cannot he repaired since no crew would he on-board. History had validated this conclusion, since the crew had been able to repair critical problems over the first several years of the Station's life. The main drivers that led to loss of Station in this analysis (in either the manned or unmanned cases) were the failure of both internal or both external temperature control system (TCS) loops, which leads to the complete loss of US TCS. Another significant driver was destructiodseverc damage to the Station due to MMOD penetration. In the unmanned case, additional drivers are present due to the unavailability of crew to address critical failures or problems. The main critical systems that were vulnerable to loss as shown in Figure 9 were failure of both internal or both external TCS loops. Another driver for system loss was the failure of the propulsion system that would result in the loss of propulsive attitude control (common cause failure of all positive or negative roll thrusters) for the Station. All of these systems that drive the loss of system probabilities are, as expected, worse for the un-manned case as the manned cases. 
4.
CONCLUSION
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) is a multi-disciplinary method used to assess many factors and to determine their relative significance within a system. The PRA models are used to assess, manage, and, if necessary, quantitatively justify the need to reduce the risk of any options being considered by management (whether in design, test, operation, disposal, etc.).
The ISS PRA is scenario-based model that has been developed over the last several years and models specific configurations of the Space Station. The reliability data driving the model has been statistically updated in a traceable manner.
These include hardware failures, software errors, human error, common cause failures, and 5.
